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Abstract: The aim of this study is to evaluate the performance of urban environmental governance
by developing hesitant fuzzy linguistic analytic network process (HFL-ANP). The study bridges the
gaps in current knowledge in the following ways: the study methodically develops the HFL-ANP
method to evaluate and pick the optimal environmental governance strategy from alternatives;
theoretically, network structure of evaluation indicators system on environmental governance is
constructed, and the objective and subjective information in the evaluation process of environmental
governance is combined. In detail, based on the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) and the
pollution haven hypothesis, the paper constructs the evaluation indexes system of environmental
governance and takes observation time length into consideration. Then, we choose three urban
cases of environmental governance by exploring the existing literature. Furthermore, we develop the
HFL-ANP method and apply it to the cases. The study calculates the initial weights of all indexes
by using multiplicative consistency of the HFL preference relation, and derives the decision matrix
through combining objective information with subjective information of environmental governance.
Finally, we come to the following conclusions: ANP network stricture is close to real-world practical
problems and provides the basis for HFL-ANP method; HFL-ANP is a very suitable method of
assessing environmental governance; and based on the urban cases of environmental governance,
Shanghai is the optimal alternative. In addition, this indicator system can only be applied to cities in
China, and the administrative hierarchy of policies has not been considered by this method. Thus,
future studies should expand this method and indicator network to contain different countries and
different administrative hierarchy.
Keywords: environmental governance; HFL-ANP; control indexes; network structure; information
1. Introduction
Since 1978, China has experienced remarkable economic growth and continuous environmental
degradation [1,2]. Moreover, environmental pollution has led to economic losses and health issues [3,4].
Especially, environmental pollution has led an estimated 3%–8% annual loss of GDP in China [1],
and about 40% of all premature deaths in China in 2010 are attributable to poor air quality [3].
Thus, China’s government has viewed environmental protection as one of the most important tasks,
and policy makers have spared no efforts to improve environmental quality and promote sustainable
development [2]. For example, Xiamen, Ningbo and Dalian stopped the PX (P-Xylene) projects due to
antipollution protests. In order to reduce social conflicts, Shifang in Sichuan Province, and Qidong in
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Jiangsu Province had to strengthen their pollution regulations. Meanwhile, a fair number of previous
studies have shown various kinds of indicators and methods to improve environmental management
performance [5–7]. However, these studies are based on quantitative or objective data evaluation;
for example, many studies regard specific emissions of pollutants as indicators [8–10]. For example,
Jiangsu Province sets annual emission reduction targets and proposes to promote environmental
governance by raising public awareness of environmental protection. However, important qualitative
or subjective indicators are ignored or replaced in the evaluation process.
In addition to the above empirical studies, some theories have also focused on environmental
governance. The environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) has discussed the relationships between
development and environment [11,12], and the pollution haven hypothesis has indicated the
enterprises’ behaviours in the process of environmental governance [10,13]. Moreover, most modern
econometric analysis has suggested the findings of EKC and the pollution haven hypothesis in
China [1,14], yet, few studies design evaluation indicators based on the above theories.
This study will assess environmental governance performance based on the theories of the EKC
and the pollution haven hypothesis. In order to include all subjective and objective information in
evaluation system, we develop the method of hesitant fuzzy linguistic analytic network process
(HFL-ANP) and choose the optimal environmental governance strategy among alternatives of
Guangzhou, Shanghai and Beijing cases. The study contributes to the existing studies as follows:
constructing the reasonable evaluation indicators system of environmental governance with the
network structure; combining the objective and subjective information in the decision-making process
of environmental governance; and selecting the optimal environmental governance strategy by using
the HFL-ANP method.
In order to assess the performance of environmental governance cases, showing the preference
information on the indexes is the most important issue. Fuzzy sets can solve uncertainty and fuzziness
of decision information [15]. Meanwhile, when policy makers would like to express their imprecise
evaluation by linguistic term sets, the fuzzy linguistic method can improve the reliability and flexibility
of decision models [16]. However, in real world, some decision makers are hesitant to choose
different linguistics. In this sense, the method of hesitant fuzzy linguistic term set (HFLTS) would be
effective to help decision makers expressing their opinions [17]. Therefore, this study takes advantage
of HFLTS to represent the decision-making information where we take the hesitant degrees of decision
makers into account.
A lot of methods have been used to evaluate environmental governance, such as Multi-Criteria
Decision Analysis (MCDA) [18], and Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) [19], especially, Analytic Network
Process (ANP) [20], which is one of the MCDA. The present study employs ANP to assess the
effective of environmental governance cases. ANP is a MCDA tool that takes complex relationships
among parameters into consideration [20]. Before developing ANP which is a generalization of AHP,
the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is developed, which is a well-known MCDA technology [21].
Though AHP is conceptually easy to operate, its strict hierarchical structure is not conductive to deal
with the complexities of many real-world issues [22]. In order to solve this problem, the ANP model
is proposed to help establish the network structure for the indexes and calculate the comprehensive
weights of all indexes [23,24]. Moreover, one of the important advantages of the ANP is to use
pair-wise comparisons to obtain weights and determine priority indicator in comparison to other
weighting approaches in which weights are assigned arbitrarily [22]. In addition, the ANP can help
convert subjective evaluation of related weights with respective to a set of overall scores and priority
ratio scale, such as preference, importance, or likelihood. Therefore, there are emerging studies on the
ANP in the following fields: forest management [25], industrial management [26,27], strategic policy
planning [28,29], and economics and finance [30].
However, there are also some disadvantages with the ANP method in existing studies. Firstly,
ANP inherits theoretical weaknesses of the assumptions of AHP because it stems directly from
the AHP. These weakness include the rank reversal problem, and the priorities derivation method [31].
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The possible rank reversal of ANP has been considerably criticized, and many methods have been
put forward to try to solve this issue, such as aggregation method and keeping the local priorities
unchanged, etc. [32,33]. Fortunately, the research questions in our study do not involve rank reversal.
Our aim is to select the best among many alternatives. Thus, when the number of alternatives
increases or decreases, we can still pick out the best even though the ranking of other alternatives
may have changed. Priorities derivation method and rank reversal are closely related to each other
because they refer to the preferences aggregation method from pairwise comparison matrices used
in the AHP and ANP. Solving a reversal problem and performing a preferences aggregation with
the use of a left eigenvector method should, as a result, produce a reverse sequence of elements
which are pairwise-compared in a matrix. Moreover, in our study, we take behavioral variables
into account, which can overcome the problem of reverse order [34]. The second challenge is a
proper reproduction of assessment scale. In the process of evaluation, experts’ suggestion can be
inconsistent and imprecise, especially in decision problems which contain many debated alternatives
or criteria, and thus, the AHP/ANP may not provide a correct solution due to decision-makers’
imprecise evaluations [35]. In our study, the policy aims of environmental governance are clear
and uncontroversial. Furthermore, our model takes both subject information and object information
into account. Above these can help us to minimize the negative impact of experts or policy makers’
actions on the results.
In our study, time length plays an important role in results because environmental governance
may present different results on different indexes in different observation time lengths. Thus, our cases
have the following characteristics: first, we have to establish a network structure to indicate the
interdependence relationships between above control indexes and time length, because the evaluation
values of control indexes, including the public, government and enterprises, can change under different
observation time length; second, the primary weights of all indexes should be changed into the
comprehensive due to the effect of time length on the public, government and enterprises in the
decision-making process. Definitely, the ANP approach is better to address above characteristics [24].
Therefore, the present study deals with the performance evaluation of environmental governance
cases by ANP method. Meanwhile, we develop a HFL-ANP to combine subjective information with
objective information. Following this Introduction, Section 2 provides the methodology used. Section 3
describes and discusses our results. Finally, the conclusions are presented in Section 4.
2. Methodology
Based on the pollution haven hypothesis and the EKC, this study analyzes the group benefits
in environmental governance, and takes observation time length into account. In above sense,
we construct the index system to evaluate the effectiveness of environmental governance. Furthermore,
three environmental governance strategies are chosen as the alternatives. Besides, based on
these indexes, we develop the HFL-ANP method to evaluate environmental governance cases.
2.1. Index System on Environmental Governance
2.1.1. Group Benefits in Environmental Governance
In order to establish a reasonable and comprehensive index system, we employ the pollution
haven hypothesis and the EKC to establish the index system. The relationships between development
and environment have been widely analyzed based on the norm of the EKC [11,36]. The EKC literature
indicates an inverse U-shaped relationship between environmental pollution and per capita income [37].
In addition, a number of empirical studies have shown the presence of EKC for environmental
pollution [1,38]. Therefore, the EKC pays attention to the contributions of the public who can promote
environmental governance. Pollution haven hypothesis suggests that enterprises with intensive
pollution tend to migrate to cities where environmental regulation is weaker [1]. Empirical evidence
has supported the hypothesis in China [10,13]. The hypothesis involves two stakeholders—enterprises
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and government. The existing studies have indicated the role of the government in pollution charges
and environmental subsidies [14,39]. Therefore, based on the pollution haven hypothesis and the EKC,
the study reveals the three stakeholders (Public, Government and Enterprises) in environmental
governance, and verifies their standpoints.
The public wants to obtain a good living environment and high quality of life through better
environmental governance. They hope that the living energy price is lower [40], and according to
the EKC, they are willing to spend their income to deal with environmental pollution. Furthermore,
the trust of the public in government is easily established and broken easily as well, and the public
satisfaction is fairly significant for promoting environmental governance [41]. The government is
closely related to the improvement of urban environment, and is the main driver of environmental
governance. For government, the regulatory costs should be decreased significantly, and the penalties
for polluters should be increased [42]. Enterprises are another key part in the environmental
governance. On the one hand, the main goal of an enterprise is to make profits, whereas protection
of the natural environment is not the main concern for enterprises [43]. On the other hand, in order
to increase profits, enterprises have to establish an environmental protection image and undertake
corresponding social responsibilities of environmental protection [44]. Moreover, enterprises are also
willing to develop or introduce new technology or new energy to reduce the cost of environmental
pollution [45]. Table 1 summaries the group benefits in the establishment of environmental governance
index system.
Table 1. Group benefits in the establishment of environmental governance index system.
Group Benefits Support Degree toEnvironmental Governance
Public (from the EKC)
1. Energy price is reduced [40];
Very supportive2. Income is increased to deal with environmental
pollution [37];





1. The regulatory costs of the government
should be significantly decreased [24]; Very supportive





1. Increasing profits is the main aim, whereas
environmental protection is not [43]; Very supportive
2. The image of social responsibilities of
environmental protection should be formed [44];
3. New technology or renewable energy should be
developed or introduced in order to reduce the cost
of pollution [45].
The above index system of environmental governance is good for the public, government and
enterprises. Consequently, they all support the promotion of environmental governance. However,
every group obtains different benefits from environmental governance. Thus, in order to balance
different benefits, obtaining a suitable weight of the group at the system is worth discussing.
Meanwhile, above index system has no specific assessment indexes from the perspective of the groups
to evaluate different environmental governance strategies. In addition, the length of observation
time cannot be ignored. The difference in observation time has different impact on the groups under
governance strategies. For instance, if the mayor in a city focuses on a long observation time, the overall
benefits of the government are the most important, whereas when the mayor pays more attention
to a short observation time, the weight of enterprises would be the highest [24]. That is, in a short
observation time, enterprises can make quick profits at the cost of environmental sacrifice and have
sufficient funds to maintain their environmental image, which can rapidly increase the quantity
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of economic growth. However, over a long observation period, when the quantity requirement
is satisfied, the government starts to pay attention to the quality of economic growth. Moreover,
in order to maintain social stability and rule, government has to conduct environmental governance
in the long term. Thus, the role of government is highlighted in a long observation time. Therefore,
in the process of establishing evaluation index system, the study takes the length of observation time
into account.
2.1.2. Specific Indexes
Based on above analysis, we construct the specific evaluation indexes for the environmental
governance strategies and list the length of observation time in urban pollution governance:
(1) Public (C1)
Living costs caused by living energy price (C11). It is one of the indexes that the public focuses on,
and can reflect the public’s choice for different living energies. This index was used to evaluate China’s
economy and environment, and the conclusion indicate that carbon emissions call for fewer price
distortions [46]. The study uses this index to express the living cost caused by environmental change
for the public.
Public participation caused by average income (C12). This index can reflect the capacity and
willingness of public participation in environmental governance. Due to poor educational experiences
and low socioeconomic status, low-income groups cannot obtain the chance of the most basic
environmental health [47]. Specifically, poor education acquisition enables low-income groups to
lack civic awareness of participating in environmental governance. Low socioeconomic status makes
them do not have enough capital to deal with health problems caused by environmental degradation.
In addition, environmental governance has different effects in high-income countries, compared with
low-income countries [48]. In detail, environmental governance encourages the public to participate in
sustainable consumption in high-income countries. Overall, the existing studies have indicated the
relationships between income and environmental governance. Thus, we use this index to characterize
the capacity and willingness of public participation in environmental governance.
Satisfaction degree (C13). It may be viewed as the most comprehensive index to reflect the public’s
attitudes to the quality of environmental governance. The environmental governance of enterprises
through customer satisfaction is examined [49]. The study using satisfaction degree to evaluate the
environmental flows in the Yellow River concludes that satisfaction degree is significant for water
resources governance [50].
The above three indexes related to the public are considered as subjective evaluation values in
HFLTS for they belong to the emotions expressed by the public.
(2) Government (C2)
Environmental regulatory costs (C21). One of government’s responsibilities is to regulate
environmental pollution, and the regulatory costs demonstrate the administration efficiency of the
government [24]. Increasing regulatory costs rises the environmental concerns [51]. (Sources: statistical
yearbooks of the three cities)
The penalties for polluters (C22). Governments tend to strengthen penalties for the
worst polluters [52]. The environmental protection department can improve the performance
of environmental governance through adjusting the penalties method for polluters. However,
excessive penalties will stifle economic development and innovation enthusiasm.
(3) Enterprises (C3)
Gross industrial output value (C31). The index is one of the important indicators, reflecting
the industrial profitability. The study on the factors impacting strategies for carbon mitigation
and industrial carbon emissions found that gross industrial output value is a major contributor to
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industrial carbon emissions [53] (sources: statistical yearbooks of the three cities and China Industrial
Statistics Yearbooks)
Enterprises image investment of environmental protection (C32). It is one of the typical indicators
for showing the intangible profit and promoting the social awareness of environmental protection.
Enterprises can benefit from image of environmental protection, and enterprises image of
environmental protection is conducive to sustainable development [54] (sources: China Industrial
Statistics Yearbooks and City Commerce and Industry Bureau)
Green patent application counts (C33). The findings on the impact of CO2 emissions on green
patent application and R&D investment indicate insight for the generation of green technology
patents [55]. Green patent technology application, as a policy instrument, has emerged to contribute to
environmental protection [56]. It is an important index to evaluate the ability of enterprises dealing
with industrial pollution (source: State Intellectual Property Office database)
(4) Length of observation time (C4)
This study refers to China’s policy “National plan for tackling climate change (2014–2020)” [57],
and important document of President Xi Jinping “National ecological environment protection” [58],
to define the time length.
Short time (C41). It shows that the effectiveness of environmental governance is assessed within
six years.
Medium time (C42). It states that the effectiveness assessment of environmental governance is
conducted between 6 years and 21 years.
Long time (C43). It refers to assessing the environmental governance more than 21 years.
The pollution haven hypothesis and the EKC indicate that the public, government and enterprises
are the important roles in environmental governance, and thus, they are viewed as the control indexes.
However, the time length is important for assessing the performance of environmental governance
because environmental governance would present different results on different indexes over various
observation time lengths. For instance, if the government or enterprises increase the R&D investment to
develop green technology, the expected performance of environmental governance will only be evident
after a long time, but this improvement cannot be observed in short time because realizing the market
value of green patents needs a long time (at least 20 years, including patent licensing, market value
transformation and practical application of technology). In addition, in a short time, the weight of the
public should be the highest whereas the weights of enterprises and government decrease, because the
decision makers pay more attention to the change of the public’s satisfaction degree, income and
cost in the short term. In a medium timeframe, the decision makers underline the development
of enterprises, which can increase regional economic growth speedily. Meanwhile, the public
attitude is still more important to social stability than the regulatory costs of government. Therefore,
the weight of enterprises is higher than that of the public while the weight of government is the lowest.
In a long time horizon, the policy effectiveness of government gradually emerges, and decision makers
concentrate on the performance of environmental governance in an overall situation. Through the
reform of regulatory costs and penalties for polluters, the public and enterprises have begun to adapt
themselves to such a new policy. Consequently, the weight of government becomes the highest,
and the weights of the public is higher than that of enterprises due to China’s “people oriented”
thoughts (the people’s democratic dictatorship of China). Overall, the above discussions underline the
importance of observation time length in evaluating the performance of environmental governance.
Besides, though the time length greatly affects other control indexes, decision makers may not offer
assessment information for alternatives directly because of the difficulty in making a judgement.
Table 2 gives us the evaluation indexes system of environmental governance, and reports the
original scale and expected direction of each index in the form of a hierarchical structure. Meanwhile,
because the time length (C4) is interdependent on other control indexes, all indexes have to be evaluated
in the network form to display their interdependence relationship (Figure 1).
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Table 2. Evaluation indexes system of environmental governance.
Control Indexes Sub-Indexes Original Scale Expected Direction
Public (C1)
Living costs caused by living energy price (C11) [46] HFLEs -
Public participation caused by average income (C12) [47,48] HFLEs +
Satisfaction degree (C13) [49,50] HFLEs +
Government (C2)
Environmental regulatory costs (C21) [24,51] N-V -
The penalties for polluters (C22) [52] HFLEs +
Enterprises (C3)
Gross industrial output value (C31) [53] N-V Depends
Enterprises image investment of environmental protection (C32) [54] N-V +
Green patent application counts (C33) [55,56] N-V +
Time length (C4)
Short time (C41) Depends Depends
Medium time (C42) Depends Depends
Long time (C43) Depends Depends
Note: HFLEs refers to the form of hesitant fuzzy linguistic, and N-V shows the form of numeric-value scale.
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2.1.3. Urban Cases of Environmental Governance
After establishing the evaluation indexes system, the study chooses urban environmental
governance cases as alternatives from the existing studies, in order to pick the optimal channel
for improving the performance of environmental governance. Finally, the study selects three successful
cases of urban environmental governance in China, including Guangzhou (A1), Shanghai (A2) and
Beijing (A3). They have all made certain achievements in urban environmental governance and
extensive literatures have focused on them.
Table 3 reports the main measures on environmental governance of our alternatives, which are
discussed in more detail below:
Table 3. Alternatives’ measures of environmental governance and relative work.
Cities Measures Related Work
Guangzhou
Conduct public opinion surveys on environment pollution
[59–61]
Increase population paying attention to pollution issues
Deal with serious industrial pollution hazards
Strength penalties for industrial pollution
Shanghai
Organize a policy committee to copy environmental issues
[62–64]Offer high environmental regulatory costs
Conduct environmental impact assessment (EIA) regulation
Beijing
Conduct co-construction and sharing mode of ecological
environment governance
[65,66]Adjust their industrial structure and upgrade industries
Strength the public’s awareness of rights and comp sati
Decrease the costs of regulation by taxation
Guangzhou. In order t identify the policy preferences of the public, public opinion surveys
have been conducted regularly by the municipal government of Guangzhou. More importantly,
there is an important trend that the increasing population is focused on pollution issues. In addition,
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industrial pollution, especially wastewater pollution, has resulted in a noticeable decline in the
environmental quality in Guangzhou. Therefore, in 2005, the Guangzhou municipal government
conducted a cleanup of the Pear River by a river revitalization proposal. In the process of governance,
public participation is required, and penalties for industrial pollution have been strengthened [59–61].
Shanghai. It is the most populous and the largest industrial city in China. Since the reform
era in 1979, it has faced the formidable task of stopping deterioration of environmental resources,
which have placed tremendous stress on industrial production. The municipal authority of Shanghai
is in a relatively active position in environmental governance and has organized a policy committee
that establishes various kinds of administrative agencies to enforce local environmental policies
and regulations. The environmental regulatory costs of Shanghai are very high. According to China
Environmental Yearbook 1990–1997, it has spent billions of yuan on environmental governance.
In addition, Shanghai conducts environmental impact assessments (EIAs), including governmental
policy processes, public participation and enterprises. EIA has made a difference to environmental
governance in Shanghai [62–64].
Beijing. Beijing has implemented a co-construction and sharing mode of ecological
environment governance. In this mode, enterprises need to adjust their industrial structure and
upgrade their facilities; the public’s awareness of rights and compensation should be strengthened;
and the costs of regulation are decreased by means of taxation. The overall aim of the mode is
that a market trading mechanism with government as the core is formed to lighten the burden of
government [65,66].
Although the above cities have made great progress in environmental governance, there is no
study to compare and analyze the shortcomings and advantages of these cities based on the evaluation
index system. Thus, in order to make such a comparison and select the optimal environmental
governance model, this study examines Guangzhou, Shanghai and Beijing as alternative approaches.
2.2. The HFL-ANP Method to Evaluate Environmental Governance Cases
The HFL-ANP method is a systematic and practical technique which can be used to select the
optimal environmental governance proposal [24]. Also, this method is widely used in the field
of medical management and clothing supplier issues [24]. In this study, we follow the steps of the
HFL-ANP method to assess the environmental governance cases and choose the best case. The first step
is to decompose these environmental governance cases under a hesitant fuzzy linguistic environment,
including goals, control indexes, sub-indexes and alternatives. Second, based on the interdependence
relations between the public, government, enterprises and time length, the hierarchy structure is
established. Third, the study establishes the decision matrix by combining numeric values and HFLEs.
Then, in order to construct the preference matrix, we conduct the pairwise comparisons of indexes
based on HFLPR (hesitant fuzzy linguistic preference relation). Fourth, the initial weights and weight
matrix are obtained. In this process, the weight matrix is limited to make all components in a row be
the same. Then, the final priority value and ranking on alternatives can be obtained. Figure 2 depicts
the HFL-ANP process which assesses the effectiveness of the environmental governance cases.
The environmental governance evaluation belongs to MCDM issue, including multi-level criteria
and alternatives. In terms of ANP, the study decomposes the MCDM problem of environmental
governance into network structure. In our study, the environmental governance is divided into four
parts: the first is the goal which is used to compare and choose the superior case for environmental
governance among three alternatives; the second is control indexes, including the public (C1),
government (C2), enterprises (C3) and time length (C4); the third is sub-indexes in Table 2; the last is
the alternatives, including Guangzhou (A1), Shanghai (A2) and Beijing (A3). As we have discussed,
there exist two-way connections between time length and other indexes. In addition, when the decision
matrix only includes the judgement on alternatives under the sub-indexes of the public, government
and enterprises, the preference information would appear between all control indexes.
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studies, not ll informat on can be measured by numeric values due to some uncertain and fuzzy
components. Using the f rm of HFLEs can make the decision-making process more accurate and
complete [24]. Therefore, copying with the decision matrix should include HFLEs and numeric values.
The previous studies have indicated that th HFLEs an be changed into numeric values by
expectation value functi n and g function [67,68]. Thus, this model is viewed as NVT fu ction:
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After the HFLEs being transformed into numeric values, the study normalize the decision matrix
by the following formulas:
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Then, we employ a subjective approach to calculate the initial weights of indexes. Due to
non-integer numbers in the processing, the discrete linguistic term set should be extended to continuous
linguistic term set, that is, δl = [0, 2τ] [69]. The multiplicative consistent HFLPR follows:
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Where, w refers the weights of indexes. When B is consistent, the study puts forward the following
method to measure the subjective weights of indexes based on HFLPR [70]. This method has also been
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wi = 1, wi > 0, i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n (14)
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Motivated by the process of heterogeneous incomplete hesitant preference relations [70],
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(15)
















































Finally, we construct the supermatrix to calculate the comprehensive weights of control indexes.
Due to the interdependences between time length and other indexes, their comprehensive weights
are different from their initial weights. The study calculates the pairwise comparison matrices
for the public, government and enterprises with respect to different time length, and the pairwise
comparison matrices for different time length with respect to the public, government and enterprises.
Table 4 gives us an example on the pairwise comparison matrix and the indexes weights for the public,
government and enterprises with respect to the short time.
Table 4. Indexes weights with respect to short time.
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Based on above matrix, when indexes Ci and Cj are independent, w
j
i is equal to 0. That is,
when the public, government and enterprises are independent each other, and when the time
length is same, above weight matrix becomes the following:
w =






























43 0 0 0

(19)
Replying on above weight matrix, we measure the limit supermatrix (W) to calculate the




3. Results and Discussion
The aim of HFL-ANP method is to choose the best case from Guangzhou, Shanghai and Beijing.
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Figure 3. Deco posing the problem of environmental governance issues.
Step 2. There exists interdependence relationships between the public, government, enterprises
and time length. Figure 3 reflects the interdependence structure.
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2018, 15, 2456 13 of 20
Step 3. Construct the decision matrix of sub-indexes and alternatives, where subjective values
and objective values are measured by HFLEs and numeric values respectively. Table 5 reports the
decision matrix.
Table 5. Initial decision matrix.
C21(Million) C22 C31 C32 C33 (Million) C11 C12 C13
A1 8973 {s2} 59% 95% 22 {s2, s3} {s2} {s5}
A2 9210 {s2, s3} 75% 90% 29 {s2} {s3} {s5}
A3 9680 {s4} 63% 79% 33 {s3, s4} {s1} {s6}
Step 4. The values of HFLEs are changed into numeric values and the decision matrix is
normalized by NVT function and normalization algorithm. The following (Table 6) is the normalized
decision matrix:
Table 6. Normalized decision matrix.
Indicators C21 C22 C31 C32 C33 C11 C12 C13
A1 0.37 0.49 0.29 0.38 0.24 0.29 0.25 0.3
A2 0.35 0.36 0.41 0.33 0.36 0.51 0.17 0.28
A3 0.28 0.15 0.3 0.29 0.4 0.2 0.58 0.42
Step 5. On basis of the pairwise judgement information, the preference matrixes of control indexes
and sub-indexes are established. The preference matrices for the public, government and enterprise to
different time length are reported in R1 to R3, and the preference matrices for different time length to
the public, government and enterprise are given in R4 to R6.
In addition, the preference matrices for sub-indexes to their control indexes in the public,
government and enterprises are indicated from R7 to R9:
R1 =
C41 C1 C2 C3










C42 C1 C2 C3










C43 C1 C2 C3










C1 C41 C42 C43










C2 C41 C42 C43










C3 C41 C42 C43










C1 C11 C12 C13














C3 C21 C22 C23









Step 6. Calculate the initial weights of control indexes through the subjective method. The results
(Table 7) follow:
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Table 7. Initial weights of control indexes.
Indicators C1 C2 C3 C41 C42 C43
C1 0 0 0 0.15 0.16 0.66
C2 0 0 0 0.26 0.73 0.05
C3 0 0 0 0.59 0.11 0.29
C41 0.07 0.29 0.46 0 0 0
C42 0.28 0.48 0.22 0 0 0
C43 0.65 0.23 0.32 0 0 0
Step 7. Measure the limit supermatrix, and Table 8 reports the final results.
Table 8. Supermatrix convergence.
Indicators C1 C2 C3 C41 C42 C43
C1 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
C2 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
C3 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
C41 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
C42 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
C43 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
Because there only exist interdependence relationships between stakeholders (the public,
government and enterprises) and time length, the initial weights of control indexes are the same
as the weights matrix. According to Table 8, the supermatrix does not change when all components in
a row is the same and n is equal to 43.
Step 8. The final priority values and the alternatives rank are calculated based on above results.
We can obtain the weights of sub-indexes by a subjective approach and the preference relationships
reported in R7, R8 and R9. Thus, Table 9 shows the weights results of sub-indexes, the public,
government, and enterprises.
Table 9. Comprehensive weights.
Control indexes Weights Sub-Indexes Weights
C1 0.15 C11 0.45
C1 0.15 C12 0.36
C1 0.15 C13 0.19
C2 0.21 C21 0.67
C2 0.21 C22 0.34
C3 0.19 C31 0.28
C3 0.19 C32 0.25
C3 0.19 C33 0.46
The calculation on the weights of control indexes through HFLPR from Step 5 to Step 8 indicates
the rank of all indexes: Government > Enterprises > The public, and Long time > Medium time >
Short time. Table 8 reports the sequence of sub-indexes’ weights. Regarding the public, Living costs >
Public participation > Satisfaction degree; in terms of government, Environmental regulatory costs >
The penalties for polluters; for enterprises, Green patent application counts > Gross industrial output
value> Enterprises image investment of environmental protection. Finally, we calculate the score of
each alternative through sub-indexes weights multiplying their decision values in Table 6. The results
are shown in Table 10.
Thus, according to the final scores of these three alternatives in Table 10, the optimal case for
environmental governance refers to Shanghai (A2), followed by Beijing (A3) and Guangzhou (A1).
In terms of numerical example, the study has assumed that the city pays more attention to the long time
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observation rather than short time and medium time. Thus, the sequence of control indexes’ weights
is government > enterprises > the public from the initial matrix (R3), which is same as the results
reported by Table 9. Meanwhile, the results in Table 10 also help us understand that the Shanghai
(A2) performs the best in C11 and C31 of the control indexes, and behaves pretty well in C21, C22, C32,
C33, C13.
Table 10. Alternatives scores.
Indicators C21 C22 C31 C32 C33 C11 C12 C13 Scores
A1 0.036 0.031 0.015 0.016 0.028 0.02 0.022 0.012 0.18
A2 0.035 0.027 0.029 0.013 0.03 0.025 0.016 0.013 0.188
A3 0.029 0.023 0.021 0.011 0.031 0.013 0.038 0.017 0.183
This study postulates that the Shanghai can really improve the performance of environmental
governance. The EIA approach of Shanghai not only increases the public participation and public
satisfaction of environmental governance, but also stimulates green patent technology innovation
and the establishment of environmental image of enterprises. In addition, the policy committee
of environmental governance in Shanghai has become an attractive topic. It advocates joint
implementation of environmental policies from different governmental departments and participation
of different stakeholder [64]. These actions not only increase the penalties for polluters, but also
decrease the environmental regulatory costs [63].
The above results also indicate the shortcomings of environmental governance in Beijing
and Guangzhou. Regarding Guangzhou, the development of enterprises does not follow a
sustainability path, but rather still focuses on the profits. Business growth at the expense of
environment can be achieved in the short term, leading to the fact that enterprises are reluctant
to spend time on green patent research and development. Though public participation in the process
of environmental governance in Guangzhou is required, there are no effective systems and channels
to ensure that such behavior occurs. As for Beijing, its main shortcomings are strong political power
and high cost of living. Our results indicate that high regulatory costs and low penalties make the
environmental protection image of enterprises poor. However, local governments and enterprises
do not focus on these issues because enterprises can make profits in the short run and government
officials can be promoted in the short term due to the increased GDP [1].
In the application process of our method, the weight of observation time length has impact
on the final weights of control indexes and all sub-indexes because of the interdependence
relationships between time length and control indexes. Underlining different time length may result
in different results. In our numerical example, the city attaching more importance to long time
length is assumed, and thus, the weight of long time length is the highest, followed by medium
time length and short time length. However, if a government is more concerned about the shorter
time length, the Shanghai may not the best alternatives. Thus, weights play an important role in
selecting the best alternatives. In our study, we test the effect of different time length on results.
To change the weights of all observation time length, the study presents different initial preference
matrices on time length of control indexes, and the values of other indexes are the same. If the weights
of time length follows the order W42>W43>W41, while the preference of matrices is indicated by R41,
R51, R61:
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If the weights of time length is W41 > W42 > W43, the preference of matrices on different control
indexes are R42, R52, R62:
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Therefore, according to above weights, the different results of environmental governance scores
are reported as follows:
According to Table 11, different weights of observation time length have different influence on
the sequence of environmental alternatives. In theory, different weights of observation time length are
able to change the weights of control indexes due to interrelationship between them. More importantly,
the change is illustrated in the process of limiting supermatrix calculation. Consequently, if the
government pays attention to a long time period, the optimal city is Shanghai; if the government
focuses on medium time, the optimal environmental governance city is Guangzhou; if a short time is
chosen by the government, the best option of environmental governance is Beijing.
Table 11. Final results with respect to different time length weights.
Time Length Sequence Weight Scores Results Sequence
W43 > W42 > W41
W41 = 0.12 A1 = 0.18
A2 > A3 > A1W42 = 0.15 A2 = 0.188
W43 = 0.23 A3 = 0.183
W42 > W43 > W41
W41 = 0.12 A1 = 0.189
A1 > A2 > A3W42 = 0.22 A2 = 0.178
W43 = 0.15 A3 = 0.177
W41 > W42 > W41
W41 = 0.21 A1 = 0.181
A3 > A2 > A1W42 = 0.16 A2 = 0.183
W43 = 0.13 A3 = 0.187
4. Conclusions
The aim of this study is to establish an effective evaluation indexes system for environmental
governance and to develop ANP applications in HFLTSs (HFL-ANP). Based on the urban cases of
environmental governance from Guangzhou, Shanghai and Beijing, we conclude the following:
Regarding evaluation network construction, the pollution haven hypothesis and the EKC help
structure the evaluation indexes system of environmental governance, including the public, enterprise
and government. In the process of constructing the evaluation indexes system, the study takes
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observation time length into account. In addition, the network structure, which connects aim,
stakeholders, time length and alternatives of environmental governance, are indicated. The structure
is close to real-world practical problems and provides the basis for HFL-ANP method.
In terms of evaluation method, HFL-ANP is a very suitable method to assess environmental
governance. The interdependence relationships between different assessment indexes of environmental
governance can be shown through a network structure of HFL-ANP method. The comprehensive
weights of all indexes, including qualitative and quantitative indicators, can be reported through
HFL-ANP method. Moreover, the final results of environmental governance based on the HFL-ANP
method can fully reveal complete decision-making information, especially the effect of different
observation times.
From the perspectives of final priority values and ranking of alternatives, Shanghai is the
optimal alternative. In order to improve the performance of environmental governance, Shanghai
conducts EIAs and has policy committees, making it a great success in the C11, C31, C21, C22, C32,
C33, and C13 areas, however, the result is based on the assumption that the government focuses on
a long time horizon of environmental governance. If government officials want to move up in the
short term, or businesses want to make profits in the short term, the results will change. In detail,
if the government prefers a medium timeframe, Guangzhou is the best alternative, and if short time is
underlined, Beijing is the optimal mode.
There are also some limitations on our study. For example, this method and index system
are only applicable to Chinese cities because China’s unique political system determines the policy
implementation paths and the interdependence between indicators. In addition, this method does not
take into account the administrative hierarchy of the government. This point is important because
policies at different administrative levels will have an important impact on the performance of
environmental governance in China. Future study may combine HFL-ANP method with some
optimization methods to solve other environmental governance issues. For instance, the combination
between HFL-ANP and simulation method can evaluate the governmental performance of
environmental governance at different administrative levels.
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